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pleadings, he has no guarantee that they will proceed accordingly. 
Once again the matter of knowledge becomes important: the prin­
cipal’s must equal that of the contractor, if he is competently to deter­
mine when the undertaking is in fact being carried out in the proper 
and most desirable manner. The possession and application of such 
knowledge, it is submitted, elevates the principal to a position where 
he is affecting, if not in fact directing, the actual mode or work; thereby 
is erased the sole distinguishing factor essential to the principal- 
independent contractor relationship.
G. W . N. Cockburn, 
111 Law, U.N.B.
REFORM OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
IN ENGLAND.
Last June seventh the Law Reform (Enforcement of Contracts) 
Act, 1954, came into force in England and W ales; and in the following 
month judgment was delivered1 in what may prove to be the last of a 
countless number of cases in which the Statute of Frauds has been 
pleaded as a defence.
The legislation, which amended section 4 of the Statute of Frauds2 
and repealed section 4 of the Sale of Goods Act,3 has met with almost 
universal approval—most people considering it long overdue. It has 
been suggested that no one is sorry to see the encF of the Statute of 
Frauds except perhaps a few law teachers, who have lost a perennially 
fertile field for lecture and examination! The Act, in the form of a 
private bill, gave effcct to the First Report of the Law Reform Commit­
tee4 presented to Parliament in April, 1953. This committee in effect 
agreed substantially with the recommendations of the Law Revision 
Committee5 with regard to these matters, and endorsed the reasoning 
of that earlier group.
The Act repealed the whole of section 4 of the Statute of Frauds 
except the clause relating to guarantees (“any special promise to answer 
for the debt, default or miscarriage of another person”). The clause 
relating to land and interests therein had been repealed before and re­
placed by section 40 of the Law of Property Act, 1925.
The Law Revision Committee, after careful consideration, had 
recommended the reform
1. C raxfords (R am sgate) Ltd. v. W illiam s and Steer M anufacturing  Co., L td ., (19541,
1 W.L.R. 1130.
2. In New Brunswick, the corresponding sections to those repealed are subsections
(at, (cl and lei of section 1, Chapter 218, R.S.N.B., 1952.
3. In New Brunswick, section 5, Chapter 199, R.S.N.B., 1952.
4. Law Reform Committee, First Report, 1953, Cmd. 8809.
5. Law Revision Committee, Sixth Interim Report, 1937, Cmd. 5449.
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on the grounds (hat fthc sections] had o u tlived  the conditions which  
generated and . in some degree, ju stified  them ; that they operated  in an 
illog ical and o ften  one-sided and haphazard fashion over a field  
a rb itra r ily  chosen; and that on the w hole they prom ote ra th er than  
restra in  dishonesty.
T lie Statute of Frauds had been passed mainly to prevent perjury in 
times when parties to an action could not themselves give evidence. 
There is no need to discuss in detail- the evils of the Statute, nor the 
reasons given for the recommendations. They have been the object 
of considerable comment; and the reasons will be found in the report of 
the Law Revision Committee.7 The same reasoning is applicable to 
Canada.
The earlier committee—the Law Revision Committee—had, in its 
recommendations, included the repeal of the clause referring to guar­
antees. A majority, however, had expressed the view that contracts of 
guarantee should be void unless in writing. The Law Reform Committee 
in its report took the middle course and suggested that the law in this 
respect should remain unchanged. As a result, the legislation did not 
repeal that clause and contracts of guarantee remain unenforceable unless 
evidenced by writing8. There is still considerable difference of opinion 
0 1 1  this point, and there are indications that the committee members 
were not unanimous in wishing that the clause remain untouched. Dr. 
Goodhart, a member of both committees, has intimated9 that it was 
feared that insistence on inclusion of guarantees in the repeal might well 
have lost the whole measure. The matter was, then, dropped for the 
time being in order that the other reforms might be effected. Although 
this difference of opinion exists with respect to guarantees, as opposed 
to the apparent unanimity with regard to the other proposals, it seems 
relatively safe to say that the weignt of opinion still favours repeal of 
this last vestige of the Statute.
The reasons given by the committee for retaining the requirement 
of writing in guarantees are weak. They point out the distinction that 
guarantees are a type of contract which most people know quite defin­
itely must be in writing, but fail to deal adequately with the hazy dich­
otomy between guarantees and indemnities. Surely there is no real 
difference in principle between these two contracts, and it seems evident 
that it arose as a result of an ingenious judicial play on words directed 
at circumventing the Statute of Frauds and thereby alleviating the in­
justices assumed to be caused bv it. It is submitted that the reasons for 
repealing the other clauses apply with equal force to contracts of guar-
6. L aw  Reform Committee Report, op. clt., p. 3, para. "2”.
7. Reprinted in (1937i, 15 C.B.R. 585.
8. The fact that the Statute of Frauds did not operate to avoid a contract (I.e. affected  
procedural rather than substantive rights* is illustrated by C raxfords case (above). 
In that case pleadings were filed months before the new Act came into force, and 
the Statute of Frauds was pleaded as a defence. Pilcher. J., noted that the new A ct 
referred to all contracts, whether made before or after it. and ruled out the Statute  
of Frauds as a defence. Inherent in the judgment was the conclusion that the 
Statute of Frauds affected only procedural rights, for otherwise no rights would  
have existed upon which an adjudication could be made.
9. Dr. Goodhart, «1954», 70 Law Quarterly Review 441; see also Mr. Gunfield, (1954), 
17 Modern Law Review 451.
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antee, and it is unfortunate that the rather artificial distinction between 
guarantee and indemnity has been retained.
In its report, The Law Reform Committee mentioned that enquiries 
were made into the position in the other common law countries and 
it wras found that no attempt has been made to change the law with 
respect to the matters under discussion. The committee did not feel 
this to be of any weight in deciding on the desirability of the proposed 
legislation. On the contrary, the belief was stated that the other com­
mon law countries might w'cll be prepared to follow the lead of England 
in the matter.
It is to be hoped that New Brunswick, and indeed all the Canadian 
legislatures, take tnis suggestion; and I would urge that in doing so they 
adopt the 1937 committee’s recommendations: i.e., extinguish the neces­
sity for writing in contracts of guarantee, as well as in the other classes, 
save of course those relating to land.
A more general need, emphasized by this particular activity in legal 
reform, is some permanent machinery for ensuring that reforms are 
effected. In the debate on the Law Reform Bill in tne Mouse of Com­
mons, Mr. G. R. Mitchison commented on the fact that it was a private 
member’s bill and pointed out that, since there is no great public pres­
sure brought to bear on such matters, the government neglects them.
T h e m achinery fo r p u ttin g  in to  effect recom m endations fo r law reform  
is lam en tab ly  lacking . . . T h ere  ought to be carefu l consideration o f 
the means by which we can get this kind o f th in g  p u t th rough  less 
accidenta lly  and m ore q u ick ly .10
Thus the inadequate provision for implementation of committee 
recommendations is deplored in England. But in New Brunswick there 
is not even a committee to which references may be made to consider 
“proper changes of a non-controvcrsial and non-party charactcr recom­
mending themselves to the legal profession as a whole and in the interests 
of those who have to make use of the law . . .  in the ordinary course of 
their lives and business.”11 True, there is a periodic revision of the Stat­
ute law, and the Barristers’ Society often makes recommendations for 
desirable reforms. Something more is needed, however, to keep the law 
abreast of modern conditions. How often is a judge heard to make a 
decision which even he himself believes contrary to justice? It is for the 
judge to determine and apply the law; for the legislature to change it 
if need be. It would be of great benefit if the legislature’s function of 
keeping the law up to date were bolstered by tne introduction of a 
whereby this duty could be discharged without impinging too greatly 
0 1 1  the members’ already overcrowded schedule. Judges should not be 
forced to achieve justice by resorting to artificial and far-fetched distinc­
tions. They themselves are the first to deplore “judge-made-law” of 
that kind.
10. M r. G. R. M itchison, M .P., Parliam entary Debates (Hansard), 12 F eb ru a ry  1954, Vol.
523, p. 1573.
11. Ibid.
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W hat is needed is a permanent and effective system whereby the 
law may be kept under constant review; a body to study aspects of the 
law anti make recommendations when changes arc considered necessary; 
and most important of all, a system which will ensure prompt and ef­
fective machinery for translating such recommendations into law.
New Brunswick has in the past shown a commendable willingness to 
implement reforms in the law when such are brought to attention. An 
example is the manner in which the legislature became the first in 
Canada to adopt the new W ills Act proposed by the Conference of Com­
missioners on Uniformity of Legislation in Canada. It is to be hoped 
that this progressive spirit will continue and that the legislature in future 
will take advantage of the work of such bodies as the Law Reform Com­
mittee. In particular, it should repeal s. 1 (a), (b), (c), (e) and s. 2 of the 
Statute of F rauds and s. 5 of the Sale of Goods Act.
—1 ’. B. Drummie,
Lord Bcaverbrook Overseas Scholar, 
London School of Economcs.
IVEAGH V. INLAND REVENUE COM M ISSIONERS *
Conflict of Laws — Voluntary Settlement of Intagible Movables — 
Proper Law of the Settlement — Imputed Intention of 
the Parties — Relevant Considerations
By a voluntary settlement dated July 1, 1907, when the territory of 
the Republic of Ireland formed part of the United Kingdom, certain 
shares, Dearer bonds and other securities were settled on E.G. for life 
with a power of appointment in favour of his wife and children. The 
settlement contained a very w'ide investment clause, including express­
ly investment in land in England, but there was no express power to 
invest in freehold land in Ireland. The settlement was drafted and 
prepared by solicitors in England and at all material times the shares 
ana other indicia of title were kept in a bank in England, although 
there was power under the settlement to keep the securities in Ireland. 
At the date of the settlement the domicile of all the parties to it was 
Ireland. It w'as executed in England. The tenant for life had married in 
1903, and by appointments made in 1946 and 1948 he surrendered his 
life interest in part of the settled property in favour of his daughters. 
On a question as to whether estate duty was exigible on £75,000 ordin­
ary shares in an English company, Arthur Guinness, Son & Co. Ltd., 
registered on the register kept in Dublin by the company and locally 
situate there,1 on the death of the tenant for life in 1949, it was held,
• 11954] Ch. 364.
1. Shares in a company are situate at the place where they can be transferred, which  
is norm ally the registered office. See D tcey's C onflict of L aw s, 6th Ed., 1949, p. 306. 
Land, Trusts In the C onflict of U w > , 1940, holds the view that "for purposes of deter­
mining the law governing trusts of intangible personal property the element of 
location of the trust property should be used in the sense of the place where the  
securities are physically kept.” (p. 211. He states that this is the view the A m eri­
can courts have taken, (p. 88>. Cf. T reasu re r of O ntario v. Blonde et a l. [1946 ] 4
D.L.R. 785; [1947] A.C. 24 (J.C.P.C.i Falconbridge, Conflict of L aw , 2nd. Ed., 1954, 
at p. 500 says in reference to the situs of shares: “ . . . it is not certain to what 
extent the tests adopted for the purposes of taxation are identical with the tests 
that should be adopted for the purpose of the conflict of laws . . .”
